Introduction
Claims that Britain is in the grip of a 'compensation culture' and, consequently, a 'litigation crisis' are asserted with increased frequency. This article reviews some of the recent evidence.
Is there a problem?
The answer to this question is hotly disputed, depending as it does on what exactly is thought to constitute the 'problem', as well as on who is asked. The growth of a 'compensation culture' implies an increased and unreasonable willingness to seek legal redress when things go wrong, 7 whilst 'litigation crisis' implies that this shift in social attitudes has been translated into undesirable (perhaps unbearable) levels of formal disputing. As we shall see, anecdotal and other evidence of varying quality can be found to support or deny these assertions.
It seems there may be a number of different problems. Frequently it appears that there are too many (successful) claims, at other times that compensation payouts are too costly, quite commonly that lawyers' fees are excessive: sometimes a mixture of all of these. What sorts of claims should count for the purposes of discussion is also disputed. In some versions, litigation risks associated with certain commercial activities are regarded as constituting part of the 'problem'. Thus, auditors and company directors have recently pressed government for special legislative protection, essentially on the basis that in an era of increasingly complex transactions and potential catastrophe risks, unlimited personal liability is too onerous and a deterrent to (efficient) market participation. 8 Other candidates for inclusion are claims before employment tribunals, largely on the basis of their number, 9 and family law disputes because they consume the largest slice of the civil legal aid budget. 10 In 2002, a report by the Institute of Actuaries concluded that there is a growing compensation culture, estimating the total cost of claims at about £10 billion a year or 1 per cent of GDP. 11 This is a very large sum of money, of course, though it represents a wide variety of claims, as well as their associated administrative costs and expenses. 12 Moreover, gauging the significance of the Actuaries' headline figure is difficult unless we have some idea what other countries spend.
In 2004, the government's Better Regulation Task Force (the 'Task Force'), drawing on an international review of the cost of just tort claims published two years earlier, listed the UK's expenditure (at 0.6% of GDP) as lower than that of ten other industrialised nations, including Canada (0.8%), Australia (1.1%), Germany (1.3%) and the USA (1.9%): only Denmark spent less. 13 The Task Force report, which government has since largely accepted, 14 denied that Britain is in the grip of a compensation culture, basing itself partly on the opinion of 'almost everyone' who gave evidence to the enquiry and partly on the declining number of personal injury claims registered in recent years. 15 In any event, the Task Force saw the problem as lying elsewhere than in the statistical facts. The 'real' problem was said to be perceptual. Allegedly, too many of us have been persuaded by media stories and the avaricious advertising of certain claims management companies that 'large sums of money are easily accessible'. 16 According to the Task Force, there is no objectively sound basis for such beliefs or for asserting that Britain is suffering from a 'have a go culture'. Nonetheless, their report paradoxically concluded that an 'urban myth' asserting its existence has been widely accepted as the reality which, in turn, has inclined an unquantified minority to press speculative claims that lack merit or are spurious. 17 These conclusions about changing attitudes to blame and responsibility chime nicely with the findings in some (methodologically doubtful) opinion polls. 18 Arguably more significant is the failure of the report to supply any hard evidence to support its conclusions. A related strand in commonly expressed opinion (seemingly shared by the Task Force) is to the effect that the mere fear of excessive litigation induces undue caution resulting in adverse social consequences. These range from the potentially serious, such as defensive medical practices 19 and schools denying pupils opportunities to engage in outdoor pursuits, 20 to the cancellation of a downhill cheeserolling competition.
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The number of personal injury claims. claims is too many. It often seems to be assumed, implicitly at least, that any increase is a cause for concern whilst a fall is to be applauded. This broadly seems to be the position of the Task Force, although they enter an important caveat. The phrase 'compensation culture', they say, is a 'pejorative term' which unfairly suggests that all 'those who seek to "blame and claim" should be criticised'. This is a position they rightly reject on the basis that in civilised communities the victims of provable injustice or wrongfully caused injury should be in a position to seek effective redress.
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There are two other considerations connected with the numbers issue. First, claimant lawyers often point out with considerable (if self-interested) justification that the great majority of injured persons never resort to the law: that it is precisely the absence of a compensation culture that characterises our liability system. In this regard, it appears that not much has changed overall since the time of the Pearson Royal Commission almost thirty years ago. 30 However, the picture is mixed. Certain sorts of claims are much more likely to be brought nowadays. Thus, the claim frequency rate by those injured in road traffic accidents has increased significantly. 31 In contrast, while actions for clinical negligence are no longer the rarity they were thirty years ago, the proportion of negligently damaged patients who do claim continues to be very smallmaybe fewer than one in fifty. 32 Accordingly, it is not entirely clear that it should be a source of satisfaction that only Denmark spends less than the United Kingdom relative to GDP when compensating injured tort victims. 33 It may be that too many wrongful harms in some areas go uncompensated or that compensation levels are low, comparatively speaking.
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A second point is whether legitimate, well-founded claims should be counted as part of the 'problem'. After all, one reason why 'compensation crisis' stories find such ready audiences seems to be related to the ways in which they reflect public anxieties about the decline of social and moral values, such as self-reliance and personal responsibility; anxieties that are represented here by tales of greedy lawyers egging on grasping claimants chasing compensation for trivial harms which in an earlier era would have been stoically shouldered without public complaint. Accordingly, any attempt to test for the existence of a 'crisis' should, arguably, look beyond the absolute numbers of injury claims to whether there has been an increase in those that are substantially without merit or are bought off simply for their nuisance value.
Unfortunately, there is no direct or reliable evidence to answer to this crucial question either. 35 Nor is it easy to find a suitable proxy measure. For example, a 1998 study of legally aided personal injury cases reported a success rate of 63 per cent overall with more than 80 per cent of road traffic claimants recovering damages. 36 This appears to suggest that the great majority of injury claims are well-founded and genuine.
However, since all the cases in the sample must have passed the Legal Aid Board's 'merits' test in order to have qualified for public funding in the first place, no such assumption can safely be made. The subsequent disappearance of legal aid effectively means that the economic imperative enshrined in 'no win-no fee' deals (alongside the 'loser-pays' costs rule) must nowadays do duty as the gatekeeper against frivolous litigation. As we shall see, lawyers are unlikely to want to act for clients unless their chances of success are good.
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Disparate Impact or Increased Cost?
Even if there is no new flood of personal injury claims overall and no convincing evidence of a growing number of frivolous ones either, there may be legitimate cause for concern if particular sorts of defendants appear to be fielding more than their 'fair'
share or if the costs of litigation or settlement are rising sharply.
The NHS is commonly said to be facing this combination of difficulties to a marked extent. In a relatively short space of time there have been very dramatic increases in both the number of claims for clinical negligence and their cost. 38 Reducing litigation expenditure permeates the government's current liability reform proposals, which is to be expected at a time when spending on the NHS and its efficiency are high on the agenda of all the major political parties. 39 Insurers warn that there are other pockets of concern elsewhere in the liability system, for example, the projected cost of future asbestos-related claims. 40 Furthermore, as the next section notes, there are 'novel'
forms of liability that have at least the potential to destabilise some public sector budgets, such as education and social services, who cannot easily pass on these costs, except to taxpayers of one sort or another.
The increasing cost of settling even standard, run-of-the-mill injury claims is an anxiety the public and private sectors (and their insurers) share, the greater flexibility of private sector organisations to distribute these losses notwithstanding. For example, one source calculates that the value of motor injury claims has been rising consistently by almost 10 per cent a year, while public and employers' liability claims have shown sometimes larger, if more erratic, increases. 41 Explanations are readily to hand for the strong upward pressure on damages awards. On top of the inevitable effects of inflation on earnings and prices, the way that compensation for death and injury is calculated is now more favourable to claimants than formerly. In Wells v Wells, the House of Lords decided that damages for future pecuniary losses (consisting principally of loss of earnings and care costs) should be based on the likely rate of return available if the award was invested in index-linked government securities rather than the stock market. 42 The effect of this change to the 'discount rate', particularly in the case of serious injury, has been to increase significantly the lump sums awarded in order to offset the expected lower levels of investment return. 43 In a separate development, the Court of Appeal in 2000 decided that the conventional sums awarded in respect of non-pecuniary losses (such as pain and suffering and loss of amenity) were too low. In consequence, this element of awards to the most seriously injured has increased by approximately a third with proportionately smaller increases for the less seriously hurt. 44 This combination of judicially-inspired increases, together with certain statutory changes, 45 has undoubtedly contributed to pushing up the size of settlements and awards and, consequently, the cost of liability insurance, though not in a directly linear manner.
Higher premiums burden those called upon to pay them and should properly concern the legal system also, which has operated for more than a hundred years on the largely unspoken assumption that the principal categories of defendants are able to insure themselves. Thus Morgan, for example, is plausibly able to say that liability insurance is 'the only thing keeping the tort system viable'. 46 In 2003, sensitive to misgivings expressed by some business lobbies about the affordability of liability (especially employers' liability) insurance, the government instituted separate enquiries by the Office of Fair Trading and the Department for Work and Pensions. 47 These reports confirm that the cost of employers' liability cover, in particular, has risen steeply over a relatively short period of time. Accounting for this outcome is less than straightforward, though it appears to have much more to do with insurers belatedly attempting to rectify accumulated losses caused by poor underwriting or investment decisions and historically unrealistic pricing policies, rather than to rises in the cost or number of injury claims. Either way, fortunately, we are nowhere near the point where mainstream liability insurance is unavailable or prohibitively expensive.
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The 'real' problem and some of its causes.
The idea that defendants are beset by ever increasing numbers of doubtful claims is not proven. Indeed, the 'problem' we started with seems to have come down to this; that whatever may be the actual likelihood of irresponsible litigation, many believe themselves to be at heightened risk of being unfairly sued. According to the Task Force, this critical misperception or 'urban myth' induces socially and economically damaging risk-averse behaviour. Reputedly, organisations become less innovative, scarce resources that would be better applied elsewhere are unproductively diverted, unnecessarily costly safety precautions are taken, sometimes beneficial activities are fearfully abandoned altogether. 49 It is worth adding that in low trust organisations operating an internal 'blame culture' there is evidence that staff are less likely to report adverse events, while the accuracy of such reports as are made is likely to be questionable. For such organisations, one unfortunate consequence is that they have fewer opportunities to learn from their mistakes. 50 Rather than trying to establish the extent of this allegedly fateful misunderstanding or document its precise effects, a difficult task at the best of times, 51 the recent analyses instead seek to identify external causes to explain what looks like a collective loss of nerve on the part of potential defendants. Effectively they say that whilst some liability stories may be media exaggerations or even apocryphal, business and the public sector have been put on the defensive by the introduction of conditional fee agreements (CFAs) and the aggressive tactics of some claims management companies and solicitors' practices. Notwithstanding that Claims Direct and The Accident Group, the initial market leaders, went into liquidation in 2003, the Task Force assert that 'people are still being encouraged to "have a go" by the more unethical claims management companies'. 52 If so, they too should soon go out of business since low chances of success mean low rates of fee recovery and unaffordable after-the-event insurance. 53 The precise effect of CFAs on the frequency of claims is presently uncertain, though economic logic suggests that their tendency should be to increase claim rates. What research has shown is that some 93 per cent of cases taken on a 'no win-no fee' basis are successful, 54 damages for psychiatric injury, 69 and the patchy relaxations to the doctrine of causation. 70 Most of these developments have been prompted by judicial assessments of what justice to claimants requires, however unsettling they may be for defendants. This is not to say that courts are unconcerned with the potentially adverse effects which an expanded liability regime might have or how that may be received by the public. Over the years, the senior judiciary, in particular, have shown themselves alert to the dangers of overkill and floodgates, despite the difficulties in gauging their extent or effect. In practice, judges commonly find themselves having to fall back on intuition and commonsense as regards the likely wider impact of their decisions since our bilateral adversarial system is not designed to facilitate informed judgments based on empirical evidence, even where this is available, which all too frequently it is not.
Nevertheless, in the post-Human Rights Act era there has been a marked reluctance to rely on unproven policy fears as a basis for striking out apparently novel duty claims. 71 Conversely, there have been occasions on which courts have plainly wanted to send a forceful message to potential claimants and the legal profession. Thus in Gorringe v Calderdale MBC, Lord Steyn warned that 'the courts must not contribute to the creation of a society bent on litigation, which is premised on the illusion that that for every misfortune there is a remedy'. 72 Another example is Tomlinson v Congleton BC in which the importance of individual responsibility was strongly emphasised when denying recovery to a 'foolhardy' adult trespasser injured diving into a lake. 73 The Task Force rightly, if somewhat naively, welcomes this as indicating that 'the tide may be turning' and as demonstrating that the occupiers of public recreational spaces 'are not expected to take extreme steps to avoid accidents'.
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What should be done?
The purpose of this paper has been to review the evidence concerning the existence of a 'compensation culture'. It has not been to evaluate the likely efficacy of the numerous and diverse suggested responses, except to say that we should be careful to avoid introducing solutions to non-existent or different problems. In this regard, both the Task Force and the Actuaries reports take a wrong turn to the extent that they focus on the supposed motivations of some injured claimants, attributing to them greater greed or other moral failings as the source of the problem. 75 It has been persuasively argued that in the United States, the usual exemplar of a compensation culture out of control, individuals are no more inherently prone to sue than the citizens in other developed societies, and that what has mattered is the extent to which American social and legal structures have actively encouraged resort to law as a primary means of resolving every sort of dispute by creating rights to sue, lowering barriers to litigation or increasing its rewards. 76 There are some structural changes that can and almost certainly should be undertaken here, such as controlling the activities of claims management companies and the way lawyers charge. Furthermore, whilst it is almost certainly too late to turn back the clock to an era when there were fewer lawyers, who were prevented from having a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of their clients' cases, that should not be a bar to regulating how and where legal services are advertised today. 77 More careful risk and experience-rating by underwriters will make insurance bite more effectively and ought to contribute to reducing accident rates. 78 Improving rehabilitation opportunities for accident victims would be beneficial to them and should reduce compensation costs, perhaps by as much as a third ultimately. 79 Encouraging defendants to resist doubtful claims as being the cheaper long run strategy seems sensible, though so long as insurers dominate the settlement process exhortation addressed to insureds alone may not work.
CONCLUSIONS
In some quarters, the number of injury claims has been made to appear as a yardstick to measure the moral (and economic) condition of the country. Are we less tolerant and more litigious? Unfortunately, the available data do not provide a conveniently consistent answer, though on balance it looks as if the British continue to be a nation of 'lumpers' rather than litigators. There is good evidence that some sorts of accident claims have risen (from a relatively low base) and that the overall costs of personal injury settlements have gone up. But there is virtually no reliable evidence about the number of bogus or exaggerated claims or whether they constitute a grave (or increasing) problem. What has been plausibly suggested is that 'some insurance industry commentators rely heavily on anecdotal evidence of a worsening environment in order to justify price increases, quoting individual cases of highly doubtful or speculative claims that cannot be truly representative of claims in general'. 80 When Lord Levene, the Chairman of Lloyd's of London, complains that a 'deluge' of claims is 'plundering the economy', 81 we sense that this may not be a totally disinterested assessment.
The Task Force analysis seems to be that if we are suffering from a crisis, it is largely one of confidence arising from the misplaced fears of potential defendants and their insurers, rather than from a culture that 'blames and claims' too much. In contrast, in spring 2005 while on the election stump the Prime Minister declared that many public servants (particularly teachers and healthcare workers) were worried that they may 'be subject to unfair legal action' and that ways must be found to 'protect' them from what Mr. Blair called a 'real problem', 82 which serves to remind us that the liability issue, being about the distribution of resources, is broadly political. 83 Recently, Harlow expressed particular concern about the incidence of claims made against state actors accused of various sorts of regulatory failure, as well as surprise at the 'culpable' lack of attention paid by policy-makers to the associated compensation issues given their likely impact on public resources and budgets. 'Tort law', she suggests, 'urgently needs a political steer and legislative input'. 84 This happened in Australia in 2002, 85 and is shortly to be provided in this country by a government bill. 86 When evaluating the bill's provisions, the scope and reliability of the evidence will (or at least ought to) be critical. Loose talk of a 'compensation culture' no doubt helps to sell the very sorts of newspapers that purport to despise it most: however, we should be cautious before we allow it to dictate the legislative (or judicial) policy-making agenda. 33 See n 13 and text. 34 The OFT report, n 6 at para 9.14, makes the important point that since insurers 'are likely to fight hard over large claims and not waste money in defending small ones, it is often suggested that accident victims are under-compensated when their injuries are serious but over-compensated when they are trivial.' 35 On the other hand, the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, and it is not difficult to find media reports of claims that appear to be devoid of merit, though their accuracy and provenance may be open to question, see n 16. The Task Force, n 13 at 11, merely confined itself to asserting that there is a 'perception' that the public is more likely to seek redress than 'ever before'. The Actuaries' report, n 7, did not attempt to quantify its concerns about unwarranted claims at all. 36 See Pleasence, n 24 at 11-13. 37 See n 54 and 55 and text. 38 The number of claims rose almost fifteen-fold between 1995/6 and 2002/03. Annual expenditure increased from an estimated £1 million in 1974/5 to £446 million in 2002/03. Where the compensation paid was below £45,000, legal costs exceeded the value of the claim in the majority of cases. See Department of Health, Making Amends. A consultation paper setting out proposals for reforming the approach to clinical negligence in the NHS, 2003, paras 31 and 35. Even so, a 'no fault' alternative to litigation was rejected as being likely to be too expensive. The number (and cost) of clinical negligence claims, almost 90% of which currently continue to receive legal aid funding, appears to be declining slowly. In 2003/04, around 6,250 claims (constituting about 1.5% of all personal injury claims) were received and the cost of settling clinical negligence cases was £422.5 million, see NHS Litigation Authority, Factsheet 3: information on claims, 2004. See too n 32. 39 Making Amends, ibid, at 9, seeks to reassure critics by declaring that the primary purpose of its proposals is not to cut compensation levels but to target resources to meeting the needs of injured patients more effectively. Nonetheless, it would be surprising if government were to be entirely sanguine about the prospect that extra investment intended to provide additional 'frontline' services might be swallowed up by ever more expensive compensation claims. An 'NHS Redress Bill' is expected sometime in 2005. 40 See Institute of Actuaries, UK Asbestos -The Definitive Guide, November 2004, estimating future claims at between 80,000 and 200,000 and the cost to UK insurers at between £4 and £10bn. The number of deaths is predicted to peak at 5,000 per annum between 2011 and 2015. The evidence from the USA is that very large numbers of costly asbestos-related claims may overwhelm the legal system as well as defendants who are inadequately insured.
